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ABSTRACT
We present a dynamic quantity setting game, where players may continuously adjust their quantity
targets, but incur convex adjustment costs when they do so. These costs allow players to use quantity
targets as a partial commitment device. We show that the equilibrium path of such a game is hump-
shaped and that the final equilibrium outcome is more competitive than its static analog. We then
test the theory using monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers during
1965-1995  and  show  that  the  hump-shaped  dynamic  pattern  is  present  in  the  data.  Initially,
production targets steadily increase until they peak about 2-3 months before production. Then, they
gradually decline to eventual production levels. This qualitative pattern is fairly robust across a range
of similar exercises. We conclude that strategic considerations play a role in the planning phase in










leinav@stanford.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economists often model strategic interactions using simultaneous one-shot games. It is as if
decisions were taken in the blink of an eye and realized instantaneously. This is, of course, a
simpliﬁcation. Complex decisions, such as entry, exit, or production are normally the result of a
long preparation process. If plans cannot be hidden from competitors and changing them is costly,
incentives to behave strategically during the preparation stage should be explicitly considered, as
they may be an important determinant of the ﬁnal equilibrium outcomes.
Consider, for example, the automobile industry. Suppose that, ahead of time, an auto man-
ufacturer has planned a certain production target. In order to achieve it, the ﬁrm needs to take
certain actions, such as hiring labor, canceling vacations, purchasing parts from suppliers, etc. If
the ﬁrm then decided to change its desired production level, it would likely need to incur some
costs adjusting the previous actions. To the extent that such preparations are not or cannot be
fully hidden from competitors, they may play a strategic role. Given the costly nature of these
adjustments, the preparation stage acts as a gradual commitment device. Firms realize that their
planned production levels aﬀect their rivals’ production plans, and use this to their advantage,
adjusting their own intentions strategically.
The main goal of the paper is to develop this argument in the context of a quantity setting
game, and to establish its empirical relevance using data from the U.S. auto industry. The ﬁrst part
of the paper constructs a dynamic quantity setting game with a planning phase and adjustment
costs. In the second part, we use data on monthly production targets by the Big Three auto
manufacturers — General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler — and show that the empirical pattern is
consistent with the theoretical prediction.
The paper makes three separate contributions. First, we present new theoretical predictions
for quantity setting games regarding the non-monotone evolution of production targeting. Since
the framework is fairly simple and general, these predictions may be relevant in a wide range of
strategic interactions. Second, we present empirical evidence that shows a similar non-monotonic
pattern of production targets in the U.S. auto industry. Since this is one of the largest industries
in the U.S., we think that documenting this pattern is of interest, even in the absence of the
underlying theoretical framework. Finally, the match between the theory and the data suggests
two important implications for the auto industry: (i) adjustment costs and strategic considerations
may play an important role in the planning phase of production; and (ii) static models may under-
estimate the competitiveness of the industry.
Section 2 contains the theoretical part of the paper. We ﬁrst present a benchmark model.
At some speciﬁed date in the future two symmetric ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition. At
date zero, each ﬁrm inherits a production structure, which serves as its initial production target.
From that point onwards, each ﬁrm can make continuous adjustments to its future production
structure, but incurs convex adjustment costs every time it does so. When inherited production
targets are not too high, both ﬁrms begin by gradually increasing their production plans. Firms
1use these intended plans as a commitment device; they want to commit to high production levels
in order to obtain a Stackelberg leadership position in the industry. In equilibrium, however, both
ﬁrms are provided with similar commitment opportunities, and thereby engage in a “Stackelberg
warfare,” each trying not to become a Stackelberg follower. As the horizon gets closer, however,
both ﬁrms become suﬃciently committed to producing high quantities. Thus, at a certain point
before the ﬁnal date, the (dynamic) commitment eﬀect becomes less important, while the (sta-
tic) incentive to best respond to the opponent’s high production target increases and becomes
dominant. Therefore, from that point on both ﬁrms start to gradually decrease their production
plans in the direction of their static best-response levels. The eventual equilibrium outcome still
remains more competitive than its static analog.
The rest of Section 2 extends the benchmark model along several dimensions and shows that
all these extensions retain the same qualitative predictions. We allow for more than two players,
various forms of asymmetries between players, time-varying adjustment costs, and uncertainty
(common across players). We then nest the benchmark model as the stage game of an inﬁnitely
repeated game. We solve for the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this game, and show that its
stationary equilibrium path exhibits the same non-monotonic pattern. Moreover, the repeated
game provides a natural way to endogenize the initial production plans, which are taken as given
in the benchmark model. It also takes the model one step closer to the reality of the empirical
application we study later in the paper.
There are three key assumptions that are important for our results. First, control variables are
strategic substitutes, leading to a commitment incentive. Second, adjustment costs are convex,
so commitment advantage monotonically increases with planned production levels. Third, all the
payoﬀs (net of adjustment costs) are collected in the end, leading to strong competitive eﬀects
once the production date is suﬃciently close. Other assumptions, we believe, are less important.
For example, all the results are obtained using a linear-quadratic structure. Namely, with linear
demand, constant marginal costs, and quadratic adjustment costs. This is done for tractability,
as solving for the equilibrium outside of the linear-quadratic framework is not feasible. Moreover,
linear-quadratic games can be viewed as second-order approximations to more general games. We
could also accommodate asymmetric costs, upwards and downwards, without aﬀecting the results,
but this again would take us out of the linear-quadratic framework.1
The model we present is a model of endogenous commitment and is therefore related to
Caruana and Einav (2005), in which we mainly focus on discrete decisions, such as entry and
exit. The current work is also close to the dynamic quantity competition literature (Cyert and
DeGroot, 1970; Hanig, 1986; Fershtman and Kamien, 1987; Maskin and Tirole, 1987; Reynolds,
1987 and 1991; Lapham and Ware, 1994; and Jun and Vives, 2004). These papers focus on the
stationary equilibrium of an inﬁnite-horizon model (or on the limit of a ﬁnite-horizon one, as
1Saloner (1987) and Romano and Yildirim (2005) study an extreme two-period version of such a model, in which
adjustement costs upwards are free while adjustment costs downwards are inﬁnitely costly. Unfortunately, this
extreme version gives rise to a wide range of equilibria, and therefore does not provide sharp predictions.
2the horizon tends to inﬁnity); they typically ﬁnd that (when actions are strategic substitutes)
the stationary equilibrium is more competitive than its static analog, as players engage in a
“Stackelberg warfare.”2 Our model shares this feature, but unlike this literature our main focus
is on the non-stationary dynamic pattern of the planning phase. One advantage in studying the
dynamics of the planning phase is its strong non-stationarity; it provides clear testable prediction
with respect to an observed and exogenous state variable, namely time. Stationary dynamic
models are much harder to test, as the static benchmark is typically not available (for example,
marginal costs are typically not observed).
Section 3 tests the predictions of the model using data on monthly production targets by
the Big Three auto manufacturers in the U.S. during 1965-1995. These production targets are
published in a trade journal approximately every month starting as early as six months before
production. We normalize production targets by subsequent production, pool production tar-
gets from diﬀerent production months, and estimate a kernel regression in order to describe the
evolution of these targets as the production date gets closer. The results show that, on aver-
age, production targets exhibit a non-monotonic pattern, which is consistent with the theoretical
prediction. Early targets, about six months prior to production, overstate eventual production
by about ﬁve percent. Then they start to slowly increase, until they peak at ten percent about
2-3 months before production. At this point, they start to gradually decline towards the even-
tual production levels. This result is robust to alternative measurements and across diﬀerent
subsamples.
The end of Section 3 is devoted to a careful discussion of the relationship between the data
analyzed and the theory previously developed. First, we discuss potential sources of adjustment
costs in the production planning phase of the industry. In particular, we emphasize the nature and
timing of contracts with suppliers of parts. Second, we discuss the link between the real production
plans held by ﬁrms and the published ﬁgures in the study. We argue that these are likely to be very
related. Finally, we discuss some relevant diﬀerences between the stylized theoretical model and
the nature of competition in the industry (e.g. inventories and product diﬀerentiation), and argue
that these gaps are unlikely to change the qualitative results. Thus, establishing the relationship
between the empirical pattern and the theoretical predictions allow us to conclude that adjustment
costs and strategic considerations play an important role in the planning phase of production and
that static models may therefore under-estimate the competitiveness of the industry.
At some general level, this work can be classiﬁed within the recent empirical studies of dynamic
oligopolies (e.g. Benkard, 2004; and Ryan, 2004). In contrast to these studies, which primarily
focus on estimating the parameters associated with a given theoretical framework, which is as-
sumed, our theoretical framework provides testable implications. Therefore, the primary objective
here is testing the qualitative prediction of the theoretical framework. Once validated, the next
obvious step, which is outside of the scope of this paper, is to parameterize the model and estimate
2This can also be viewed as a dynamic extension of a “top dog” strategy within the Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)
taxonomy of strategic behavior.
3structural parameters.
The data we use in this work is also used in Doyle and Snyder (1999), who investigate the role
of the published production targets as an information sharing device by focusing on the positive
correlation among manufacturers in the revisions to their production targets. Our results are
consistent with their theoretical framework, which provides no restrictions on the way production
targets evolve over time. Their results are also consistent with ours, as the model of this paper
predicts that manufacturers would follow similar patterns over time, thereby creating positive
correlation in revisions of production targets. Therefore, we view the two studies as complemen-
tary; the observed pattern of production plans may well be driven by both information-sharing
motives as well as strategic commitment considerations. In fact, we pool observations from diﬀer-
ent periods in order to average out the period-speciﬁc “noise.” The period-speciﬁc patterns vary
quite substantially and may be driven by diﬀerent realizations of uncertainties. Our framework
is therefore more relevant for the average pattern rather than for the period-by-period pattern,
while information-sharing motives are more likely to be important and observed within produc-
tion periods. We believe that any attempt to quantify either eﬀect, by, for example, estimating
structural parameters, should take both eﬀects of strategic considerations and uncertainty into
account.
2T h e o r y
2.1 The benchmark model
There are two players. At time t =0 , they start with exogenously inherited initial production
plans of (q1(0),q 2(0)).A ta l lp o i n t st ∈ [0,T] each player i chooses xt
i ∈ R, which controls the rate
at which she changes her production plan, i.e. q0
i(t)=xt
i.N o t et h a txt
i can be either positive or
negative. If a player changes her plans at a rate of xi, she has to pay adjustment costs of ci(xi,t).
At time T, and given their ﬁnal plans, q1(T) and q2(T), players compete in quantities and collect
ﬁnal payoﬀso fπi(qi(T),q j(T)).
In order to make the model more tractable, we use a linear-quadratic structure. Thus, we
assume that inverse demand is linear, given by p = a−b(q1+q2), and marginal costs are constant
and given by c. Thus, we have that
πi(qi(T),q j(T)) = (a − bqi(T) − bqj(T))qi(T) − cqi(T)= (1)
=( a − c)qi(T) − bq2
i (T) − bqi(T)qj(T)






Note that adjustment costs are constant over time,3 symmetric across players, and symmetric for
3For simplicity, there is no time discounting. Time discounting is a special case of the extension of the model to
time-varying adjustment costs, which we analyze later.
4positive and negative rates. None of these properties is important for the main results.
We solve for the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the model. Thus, strategies only depend on
the state variables, q1 and q2 and time t.L e tV t
i (qi,q j) be the value function for player i at time t,
with state variables qi and qj.I fV t
i (qi,q j) exists and is continuous and continuously diﬀerentiable






























































The linear-quadratic structure is attractive. It is known that in this case, if one restricts the
strategies to be analytic functions of the state variables, there exists a unique equilibrium of the
game, which is also the limit of its discrete-time analog. Moreover, in such a case the unique
value function is a quadratic function of the state variables.4 Note that due to the inherent
non-stationarity of the model, the parameters of this quadratic equation will depend on t in an
unspeciﬁed way. We can express the value function as
V t
i (qi,q j)=At + Btqi + Ctqj + Dtq2
i + Etq2
j + Ftqiqj (6)





(Bt +2 Dtqi + Ftqj) (7)






















This is a polynomial in qi and qj. Since it has to be satisﬁed for all values of qi and qj, all its
six coeﬃcients (which are functions of t)h a v et ob ee q u a lt oz e r o .T h i sg i v e st h ef o l l o w i n gs e to f
ordinary diﬀerential equations. To ease notation, we can just think of time as going backwards.
4See Kydland (1975), who shows uniqueness for a discrete-time version, and Lukes (1971), Papavassilopoulos
and Cruz (1979), and Papavassilopoulos and Olsder (1984) for analysis of existence and uniqueness in ﬁnite-horizon
linear-quadratic diﬀerential games.
5This is convenient as our boundary condition is for t = T. Thus, all derivatives with respect to
time (A0, B0, etc.) reverse signs, and the law of motion for the parameters is given by
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with boundary condition (for t = T)

 

























      

(10)
which is provided by the proﬁt function in equation (1).
2.2 Illustration
The system of ordinary diﬀerential equations given by equation (9), with its boundary condition,
deﬁnes the solution. It deﬁnes the value function at any point in time, which in turn allows us
to compute the equilibrium strategies using equation (7). Unfortunately, the system cannot be
solved analytically, so we approximate the equilibrium through the solution of the discrete-time
analog of the game for very small time intervals.
Throughout this section, unless otherwise speciﬁed, we set a = b =1 , c =0 , θ =1 ,a n dT =1 0 .
This implies that marginal costs are zero and that inverse demand is given by p =1− q1 − q2.
Adjustment costs are ci(xi,t)=1
2x2
i.5 For later comparison, it is useful to observe that, for this
choice of parameters, the static Nash equilibrium of this game involves each player producing her
Cournot quantity of q = 1
3, while the Stackelberg leader and follower production levels are q = 1
2
and q = 1
4, respectively.
Figure 1 shows how the parameters of the (symmetric) value function, as given in equation (6),
evolve over time. As the horizon becomes longer (i.e. as T →∞ ) A0 converges to approximately
0.0925 and all other parameters approach zero. Thus, for games with long horizon the equilibrium
proﬁts converge to 0.0925, which are approximately 17% lower than the static Cournot proﬁts of
1
9 (14% is due to higher production and lower equilibrium prices, while 3% is due to adjustment
5One should note that some of these restriction are not important. The eﬀect of a and c only enters through their
diﬀerence a − c, so setting c =0is only a normalization. Similarly, optimal strategies are invariant to monotone
transformations of the objective function, so, for example, setting b =1is a normalization.
6c o s t s ) .T h i si st h eﬁrst illustration of how the dynamic interaction leads to a reduction in proﬁts.
If they could, the two parties would have liked to avoid the “preparation race” and commit to the
static Cournot outcome throughout.
Figure 2 presents the symmetric equilibrium path for the game in which both players inherit
an initial production plan at the static Cournot level. The two parties begin by increasing their
targets, each trying to become a Stackelberg leader, or at least not to fall behind and become
a Stackelberg follower. As the deadline gets closer, both ﬁrms realize that they are suﬃciently
committed to high output, but that they are much above their static best responses, and optimally
decide to gradually adjust towards it. Given that adjusting is costly, the parties do not adjust all
the way to the static Nash equilibrium.6 In this particular example, the equilibrium outcome is
about 0.37, compared to the static outcome of 1
3. Finally, we also depict one oﬀ-equilibrium-path
strategy for each player. Suppose that player i receives an unexpected shock to her intended plan
at t = T −4 and has her plan reverted to the Cournot level. Both players realize that player j has
achieved a leader position in the market. Player j capitalizes on this advantage by increasing her
own plans even further. Meanwhile, player i’s best response is to rebuild its size. Nevertheless, the
advantageous position acquired by player j never fully diminishes and is kept until the production
date.
Figure 3 presents the symmetric equilibrium path for diﬀerent initial production plans. If these
are not too high, one observes the same pattern as in the previous ﬁgure. If initial production
plans are suﬃciently high (greater than about 0.44 in this particular example), both parties are
suﬃciently committed to high production from date zero and do not need to engage in further
increases of production targets. The rate at which they decrease their production targets over
time is not constant, however, due to the commitment eﬀect. They ﬁrst decrease quantities slowly,
so they remain committed to high quantities, and only later they speed up adjustments in the
direction of their static best response levels.7
Figures 4 and 5 present comparative statics with respect to the length of the horizon and
with respect to the size of the adjustment cost parameter. An inspection of equation (9) reveals
that these two exercises are similar. A proportional increase in the adjustment cost can be
viewed as a slowdown in the evolution of the value function. Loosely speaking, it is a horizontal
stretch of Figure 1. Thus, changes in the adjustment cost parameter are similar to a rescaling of
time.8 Figure 4 shows how the length of the horizon aﬀects the equilibrium path. As the horizon
6With convex adjustment costs, the optimal strategy always leads to partial adjustments. This is because the
static proﬁtf u n c t i o ni sﬂat at the static best response level. Thus, the marginal cost of adjustment is zero for small
adjustments and higher for greater ones, while the marginal beneﬁt is strictly positive for small adjustments but
zero for full adjustments.
7Note that if the initial targets were very low and the adjustment parameters high, one could also see a fully
increasing equilibrium path.
8It is similar but not identical. Think of the game in discrete time. A lower θ is similar to increasing the length
of a period, without changing the number of periods. Increasing T is similar to increasing the number of periods,
without changing their length. Thus, loosely speaking, stretching of time allows for more opportunities to adjust
7gets longer, there is more time to build up commitment. Similarly, Figure 5 shows that as the
adjustment costs decrease, building commitment becomes cheaper. In both cases this leads to
higher targets and an ultimate faster decline.
2.3 Intuition from a two-period model
The key qualitative prediction of the model, namely that players have an incentive to exaggerate
their production intentions as a way to achieve commitment, can be obtained within the context
of a simple two-period model. Suppose that ﬁrms start with inherited production targets of y.
At t =1they can revise their plans to z1 and z2, but pay a quadratic adjustment cost when they
do so. Then, in period t =2ﬁrms have a ﬁnal opportunity to revise the quantities they want
to produce and set them to q1 and q2, paying the corresponding adjustment costs. Given these
production levels, market price is given by p =1−q1 −q2. There is no discounting, so payoﬀsa r e
the ﬁnal Cournot proﬁts (with zero marginal costs) minus any adjustment costs incurred in the
process.
We can solve for the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game using backward induction. In
period t =2each player i chooses qi to solve
max
qi
(1 − (qi + qj))qi −
θ
2
(qi − zi)2 (11)
Best response functions are
qi =
1 − qj + θzi
2+θ
(12)
and the second period equilibrium strategies are
qi(zi,z j)=
1+θ(1 + (2 + θ)zi − zj)
(θ +3 )( θ +1 )
(13)
O n ec a ne a s i l yo b s e r v et h a ti fﬁrms target the Cournot quantities, zi = zj = 1
3, then setting
qi = zi for each i is an equilibrium. In general, the ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne a best-response
function which is a rotation of the static best-response at the previously targeted production level
(see Figure 6). Each player’s response to a change in her opponent’s quantity is not as strong as
in the absence of adjustment costs. Thus, if zi = zj are greater (less) than 1
3 the players end up
adjusting in the direction of their static best responses, but not fully, thereby ending up in a more
(less) competitive equilibrium.
In period t =1ﬁrms choose zi and zj, accounting for the equilibrium strategies at t =2 .
Thus, each player i chooses zi to solve
max
xi
(1 − qi(zi,z j) − qj(zi,z j))qi(zi,z j) −
θ
2
(qi(zi,z j) − zi)2 −
θ
2
(zi − y)2 (14)
implying the following ﬁrst order condition for each player:
∂qi
∂zi














− θ(zi − y)=0 (15)
behavior.
8This yields a solution z(y,θ) and q(y,θ).9 For example, if y = 1
3,i . e .ﬁrms’ inherited targets are
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(16)
which are always above 1
3 for any θ>0.W h e nθ =1 , for example, equilibrium targets at t =1
are z ≈ 0.357 and ﬁnal productions are q ≈ 0.339. Thus, the qualitative conclusions are the same
as in the continuous time case: planned production levels increase ﬁrst, and decrease later.
2.4 Extensions to the benchmark model
Here we present some of the most natural extensions to the benchmark model. The main message
is that all of them retain the same qualitative predictions of the model. The derivations are
provided in the appendix.
N players: The benchmark model is constructed for two players only for convenience. Results




k6=i,j qjqk, which results in an additional equation in the system of diﬀerential equations.
We computed the equilibrium for diﬀerent sets of parameters and the equilibrium patterns are
qualitatively identical to those obtained for the two-player model.
Asymmetric players: Asymmetries among ﬁrms can be introduced either through the ﬁnal
payoﬀ function (for example, ﬁrms may vary in their marginal costs) or through the adjustment
costs (for example, labor may be more unionized in one ﬁrm than the other). In the appendix we
treat them jointly, but we do comparative statics on each dimension separately.
Figure 7 illustrates the case of asymmetric marginal costs. In particular, it uses the same
parameter values as in Section 2.2, but introduces a (constant) marginal cost of 0.2 for player 2.
The ﬁgure presents the equilibrium paths for diﬀerent (but symmetric) initial conditions. The
general pattern is similar to the benchmark case. Now the more eﬃcient player produces more
than her opponent, and more than her static Nash equilibrium quantity (q1 =0 .4 and q2 =0 .2).
In this case the less eﬃcient player may produce less than her static Nash quantity. This is shown
in the thin solid line. The reason for this is that asymmetric marginal costs introduce asymmetries
in the commitment opportunities. Given that the more eﬃcient player is producing more, her
static payoﬀ function is steeper around the equilibrium. This allows her to enjoy higher levels of
commitment and attain a Stackelberg advantage. In all cases, however, overall quantity is higher
(more competitive) than the static equilibrium level of 0.6. This might hint a welfare improvement,
due to both higher consumer surplus and more eﬃcient allocation of resources among the ﬁrms,
but one has to include the adjustment costs in the analysis to obtain a deﬁnitive answer.





9Figure 8 presents the case of asymmetric adjustment costs for diﬀerent values of the θ coef-
ﬁcients. The shape of the equilibria is the same as before. It is interesting to notice that it is
the more ﬂexible player who is able to end up producing more. When adjustment costs are high
(θ1 =1and θ2 =5 ) this is simply because player 2 cannot aﬀord to increase her plans so rapidly
(recall that initial plans and the length of the horizon are ﬁxed in this exercise). When the costs
are lower the leadership position is achieved through the higher ability of the ﬂexible player to
increase her plans further as a way to commit to high output.10
Time-varying adjustment costs: One may argue that adjustment costs may vary over time.
One reason may be discounting, which would result in declining adjustment costs. It is also
reasonable to consider that adjustments become more expensive as the production date gets
closer. As an example, hiring temporary labor three months before production may be cheap,
while labor availability one day before production is scarce, and will require higher wages or higher
search costs on the employer part.11
It is straightforward to incorporate such eﬀects into the benchmark model. The adjustment






where no restrictions are imposed on θ(t). The derivation of the system of ordinary diﬀerential
equations is the same as in equation (9), with θ replaced by θ(t).N o t i c e t h a t θ enters into the
system in a proportional way. Therefore, replacing it by θ(t) is similar to a rescaling of time.
When θ(t) is low the coeﬃcients on the value function change fast, and when θ(t) is high the
coeﬃcients change slow. Qualitatively, the predictions of the model remain unchanged.
Uncertainty: In the presence of uncertainty, there is a general trade-oﬀ between commitment
and ﬂexibility, as remaining ﬂexible would allow ﬁrms to adjust to unexpected events. The
precise impact of considering uncertainty within the context of this work will depend on the type
of uncertainty explored. In the appendix we consider a model with a natural source of common
uncertainty within the linear-quadratic framework. Suppose that ﬁnal demand can be high or
low depending on whether the state of the economy is either high (H)o rl o w( L). The economy
(symmetrically) ﬂuctuates between the two states following a Poisson process: at each point, at
hazard rate λ the state changes.
Initially, with the horizon far enough in the future, the current state is not particularly infor-
mative about the ﬁnal state of demand. Given that ﬁrms only care about the eventual realization
of demand, on equilibrium they start by having a similar behavior independently of the actual
state. As the production date draws near, however, ﬁrms become more responsive to changes in
10Note that if the initial inherited positions were higher, say q0 =0 .4, and the adjustment costs high as well, the
previous result could be reversed. In this case the non-ﬂexible player would be at a credible position not to change
her plans far away from 0.4, which would force the ﬂexible player to adjust downwards.
11This second case is closer to the framework studied in Caruana and Einav (2005).
10the state of the economy. This typically results in upwards (downwards) adjustments to produc-
tion targets in response to changes into the high (low) state. As ﬁrms foresee this happening,
they are more reluctant to adjust early, compared to the benchmark model, and therefore build up
commitment more slowly. While the equilibrium path is random as it depends on the realization
of uncertainty, the expected equilibrium path (computed numerically) exhibits a non-monotonic
pattern as in the benchmark model.
2.5 Repeated interaction
Many real-world situations, like the monthly production decisions in the auto industry we study
later, are repeated in nature. Here we consider an inﬁnitely repeated game in which the benchmark
model is the stage game and there are adjustment costs between stages. These costs between
stages capture the fact that ﬁrms are constrained in their future plans by their actual production
infrastructure.
Formally, each stage of the game is played as follows. Given last period production of (y1,y 2),
players ﬁrst decide simultaneously on their initial production plans q1(0) and q2(0) for next period,
but pay a cost of
ϕ
2 (qi(0) − yi)
2 when they do so. For the next T units of time they play the
benchmark model with inherited initial plans of (qi(0),q j(0)) and quadratic adjustment costs with




2 if they do so (where t is the time elapsed since the beginning of the period). At
the end of each stage, production takes place and the stage payoﬀs are collected. Players discount
proﬁts with a common discount factor β per period. For simplicity we assume that players do not
discount payoﬀsw i t h i nap e r i o d .
We solve for a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Thus, the state variables are the
most recent production plans and the elapsed time t. Given that the game has a linear-quadratic
structure, we guess that the value function is quadratic in the state variables. We search for an
equilibrium satisfying this assumption and ﬁnd one, justifying the initial guess. The solution to
the value function within each stage follows the same law of motion as in the benchmark model
and thus satisﬁes equation (9). The boundary condition is diﬀerent: in this case, it is determined
endogenously as part of the equilibrium. In particular, there is a relationship between the value
function at the beginning of the stage game and the value function at the end of it. We establish
this relationship below.













which leads to the following ﬁrst order condition:
B0 +2 D0qi + F0qj − ϕ(qi − qi(T)) = 0 (19)
Equation (19), together with its analog for qj, provides a closed-form relationship between (q1(0),
11q2(0)) and (q1(T),q 2(T)). Since, by construction
V T




2 + βV 0
i (qi(0),q j(0)) (20)
we can substitute the relationship between (q1(0),q 2(0)) and (q1(T),q 2(T)) into equation (20). As
this has to be satisﬁed for any qi(T) and qj(T) we can equate coeﬃcients, and obtain a system
of six equations that provides a closed-form relationship between A0,...,F 0 and AT,...,F T. This
is the boundary condition that substitutes equation (10) of the benchmark game. The solution
to equation (9) and this new boundary condition constitutes the MPE of the repeated game.
Finally, we focus on the steady state of the equilibrium, in which the production decisions (but
not production plans) are constant at every stage.
The equilibrium is computed by numerically searching for a solution. One starts with a guess
for AT,...,F T, and then iterates the law of motion in equation (9) to obtain A0,...,F 0. Then,
using the boundary condition one obtains new values for AT,...,F T. We iterate this procedure
until convergence. Although, in general, one cannot establish uniqueness (or even existence) for
this game, the problem seems to be well behaved. The procedure converges extremely rapidly to
the same values for a wide range of initial conditions. Thus, on numerical grounds, we believe
that the repeated interaction game has a unique symmetric MPE, or at least a unique symmetric
linear-quadratic MPE.
In Figure 9 we show the equilibrium path for the usual benchmark parameter values (a = b =1 ,
c =0 ,θ=1 ,T =1 0 ), a discount factor of β =0 .9,a n dϕ =0 .1. As one can see, the equilibrium
stage pattern exhibits the same hump shape as in the benchmark model. The production levels
are now higher than what would be produced in the benchmark model if the inherited plans were
the ones from the steady state equilibrium. This is because, in addition to the commitment eﬀect
already described, there is a dynamic eﬀect of commitment through the adjustment costs between
stages. This second eﬀect is the same that is present in all dynamic quantity games with sticky
controls analyzed in the literature (Maskin and Tirole, 1986; Reynolds, 1987 and 1991; Jun and
Vives, 2004). Its importance is diminished in this model by the fact that the planning phase
provides an additional opportunity to revise production levels. Naturally, this additional dynamic
eﬀect increases with θ and decreases with T. Figure 10 provides some comparative statics with
respect to the relative importance of the two types of adjustment costs by varying ϕ and θ.A so n e
can observe, ϕ primarily aﬀects the size of the jump between production levels and initial plans
for the subsequent production period, with high values of ϕ implying small jumps. In contrast, θ
primarily aﬀects the shape of the production plan adjustments and ﬁnal equilibrium production
levels.
One important special case of the repeated game is the one in which ϕ =0 . I ns u c ha
case, there is no link between consecutive production periods and the model collapses to the
benchmark model with free initially chosen plans. That is, at t =0players decide simultaneously
and costlessly on their initial plans (q1(0),q 2(0)) and then continue playing as in the benchmark
model. In the simultaneous-move game played at date zero players solve equation (18) (with
12ϕ =0 ), implying a unique equilibrium of




These initial plans give rise to an equilibrium path, in which production plans are ﬂat at t =0
and gradually decline thereafter (see also Figure 10).12 For any ϕ>0, however, the equilibrium
path presents the hump-shaped pattern emphasized throughout.
3 Evidence
3.1 Data
We use data on domestic production targets of the major auto manufacturers in the U.S. These are
the same data used by Doyle and Snyder (1999).13 Therefore, we focus only on the dimensions of
the data that are relevant for our empirical analysis; Doyle and Snyder (1999) provide descriptive
statistics and further details of the data.
The unit of analysis is a production month. Prior to each production month, the Big Three
U.S. auto manufacturers — General Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler — decide about their pro-
duction targets for future months.14 These targets are posted in a weekly industry trade journal,
Ward’s Automotive Reports, which specializes in industry data and statistics. Targets are posted
approximately every month, starting as early as six months prior to actual production.
Production targets are summarized by the number of cars to be produced by each manu-
facturer, aggregated over all models. Thus, variation across models or the introduction of new
models cannot be directly used. The data set has a panel structure and covers the years 1965
to 1995, for a total of 372 production months.15 Every time a production target is published, it
includes production targets for all three manufacturer. Thus, manufacturers do not decide when
to post their targets, as this is requested by Ward’s. Overall, we observe 1,621 production targets
for each manufacturer.16 This amounts to an average of 4.42 production targets per production
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13We are extremely grateful to Maura Doyle and Chris Snyder for the willingness to share their data with us.
14These targets are being described by various synonyms: “assembly targets,” “assembly schedules,” “production
plans,” “production forecasts,” etc.
15Some of the observations in the data include post-production revisions. We discard these observations. We
only focus on targets posted before production. Five production months have no pre-production targets, and are
therefore omitted from the analysis.
16The data also include production targets for American Motors (AMC) until its exit from the market in 1987.
We do not use these data for the reported results. AMC has a small market share (2.3% on average) and it exhibits
a similar pattern to that of the Big Three, with the exception of its last three years of operation, during which
AMC’s market share, production, and production targets rapidly declined. The qualitative results of the paper
remain unchanged if we use pre-1984 AMC data.
13month, ranging from some cases with a single production target to others with up to 12 associated
targets.17
Figure 11 presents the total number of published targets made at each 10 day interval prior to
actual production.18 It shows that production targets are published approximately once a month,
typically on the last week of the month, although one can see some density between the monthly
peaks. One can also observe that the number of observations is quite stable over the 3-4 months
before production. There are signiﬁcantly fewer earlier observations.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
Let us ﬁrst introduce some notation. Denote by Qit the actual quantity produced by manufacturer
i during month t.D e n o t eb y Ad
it the production target made by manufacturer i for production
month t,w i t h−d representing the number of days between the date of the production target and
the target date. Namely, if a production target Ad
it is made at date t0 then d = t0 − t.T h ef o c u s
o ft h ea n a l y s i si so nt h ew a yi nw h i c hAd
it evolves with d.
In order to make targets comparable over time and across manufacturers, we normalize all








it is the percentage deviation of the target from the eventual production; it is positive
(negative) when a production target is higher (lower) than eventual production.19,20 Our key
theoretical prediction concerns the change of ad
it with respect to d. We expect ad
it to gradually
increase early on, when d is high (in absolute value), and decrease later, as it gets closer towards
the production date.
Our analysis is based on pooling observations from multiple production months. The under-
lying assumption is that, up to the normalization, the same game is played repeatedly over time.
This enables us to treat diﬀerent production targets in diﬀerent games as if they are made in the
17The frequency of posted production targets signiﬁcantly increased in the 1970s. The average number of pro-
duction targets per production month was 2.13 during 1965-1975, compared to 5.94 and 5.32 during 1976-1985 and
1986-1995, respectively.
18Since production decisions reﬂect total production for the month, we follow Doyle and Snyder (1999) and use
the last day of the production month as the relevant “date” of production.
19This transformation of the data is similar to the PPE measure used in Doyle and Snyder (1999). Our measure
uses a slightly diﬀerent normalization to relate it more closely to the theoretical predictions. All the qualitative
results are robust to alternative normalization choices, including the PPE measure of Doyle and Snyder.
20There are six instances of extreme outliers. Five of them are due to unexpected low Qit’s, which generate high
a
d
it’s, more than three times eventual production (a
d
it > 2). The sixth instant is of zero announcements by Chrysler.
While these cases do not aﬀect the general pattern in any important way, we drop them to reduce noise. We take
a conservative approach and also drop all other production targets (at diﬀerent times and by other manufacturers)
associated with the same production month. This leaves us with 361 production months and 1,598 targets by each
manufacturer for the empirical analysis.
14same context. We then use quartic (biweight) kernel regressions of ad
it on d to non-parametrically
describe the evolution of production targets over time. In all ﬁgures, we use a bandwidth of










,a n df o rd i ﬀerent subsamples of the data. In this sec-
tion we describe our ﬁndings; we defer to the next section the discussion of the link between the
empirical exercise and the theoretical assumptions.
The key evidence is presented in Figure 12, which pools all production months in the data.
The qualitative picture is of a non-monotonic pattern. On average, production targets start about
5 percent above eventual production levels and gradually increase. They peak 2-3 months before
production at about 10 percent, and then gradually decline towards actual production levels. This
pattern is not uniform across manufacturers. While Ford and Chrysler, the two smaller ﬁrms,
follow a similar non-monotonic pattern of production targets, GM exhibits a diﬀerent behavior.
GM’s average initial production target is about 15 percent above its eventual production level,
and it gradually declines as the deadline gets closer. This is not inconsistent with the model: if
initial production targets are high, the model predicts a gradual decline over time. It would be
interesting to explain why GM’s (relative) initial production plans are consistently higher than
those of Ford and Chrysler. In the repeated game model, for example, such variation could arise
if the ϕ parameter for GM is suﬃciently close to zero.
The dashed lines in Figure 12 report 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. These are computed
by bootstrapping the data, and running the same kernel regression on each bootstrapped sam-
ple; the dashed lines in each ﬁgure report the point-by-point 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles. These
show that the observed decline in planned production towards the production deadline is quite
precisely estimated. This is a pattern that it extremely consistent across manufacturers and for
diﬀerent subsamples. Figure 12 also shows that the conﬁdence intervals signiﬁcantly shrink as the
production deadline gets closer. This happens for two reasons. First, as may be expected, the
variance in the estimates is lower close to the day of production. This may be due to information
shocks, which are likely to be more pronounced when the production deadline is further away in
the future. The second reason is apparent from Figure 11: the number of observed production
targets 3-6 months before production is signiﬁcantly smaller than the number of observations 0-3
months before production.
Our theoretical prediction concerns a non-monotonic pattern of production targets with respect
to the same production month. A potential concern may be that while the average pattern shown
is qualitatively consistent with the theoretical prediction, it may be generated by aggregation over
periods, but is not present in individual patterns.21 To address this concern, we repeat the same
exercise for diﬀerent subsamples of the data. Figure 13 divides the sample into three decades.
Figure 14 performs the analysis for each calendar month separately to account for potential
21For example, one could imagine an extreme case in which half of the patterns are monotonically increasing
and concave and half are monotonically decreasing and concave. In such a case, the average pattern may show
non-monotonicity even though none of the individual patterns is such.
15seasonal variation (due, for example, to model-year product-life-cycle eﬀects; see Copeland, Dunn,
and Hall, 2005). Figure 15 repeats the exercise separately for months in which production growth
is positive and months in which production growth is negative. All these exercises show similar
qualitative patterns. First, the declining production targets during the last 2-3 months before
production are present in every single regression. Second, in the majority of the cases one can
observe the increase in production targets early on. This second observation does not hold in
every regression. This may be expected because, as already mentioned, the data are more noisy
for early targets.
As already discussed, the non-monotonic pattern predicts a positive slope of ad
it with respect
to d early on, and a negative slope towards production. In order to test directly for the change in
slopes, we perform two ﬁnal exercises. First, we divide production targets into three categories —
Early, Middle, and Late — according to how far in advance these targets are made. Table 1 reports
the frequencies in which (i) early targets are lower than intermediate targets, (ii) intermediate
targets are higher than late targets, and (iii) late targets are higher than eventual production. We
report this for each manufacturer, as well as for the Big Three average. All these 12 frequencies
except one are greater than 50%. None of them is signiﬁcantly lower than 50% and the majority
of them are signiﬁcantly higher. This is all consistent with the theory, and gives support to the
non-monotonic pattern.











it are two consecutive production targets associated with the same production
month. We then run similar kernel regressions of sd
it with respect to d. Figure 16 reports these
regressions. One can observe that in all cases the slope of production targets is positive between
130 days and 80 days before production, and that the conﬁdence interval for the slope estimates
lies entirely or almost entirely, depending on the manufacturer, in the positive region. Later on,
the slope is signiﬁcantly negative in all regressions, establishing the non-monotonic pattern.
3.3 Discussion
The theoretical model presented abstracts from certain important aspects of the empirical ap-
plication, such as inventories, product diﬀerentiation, and multi-product manufacturers. While
any quantitative analysis ought to account for these eﬀects explicitly, we argue that the qualita-
tive predictions should still hold. The key for the theoretical results is that control variables are
strategic substitutes. Thus, as long as production decisions, rather than sales, operate as strategic
substitutes, the existence of inventories should not have a qualitative eﬀect on the theory, and
therefore on the interpretation of the empirical exercise. Moreover, as long as inventories (and,
to a lesser extent, quantity produced abroad) are roughly stable over time, it seems diﬃcult for
16inventory ﬂuctuations per se to generate the pattern of production targets we observe.22 Simi-
larly, product diﬀerentiation and multi-product ﬁrms are also unlikely to change the maintained
assumption that control variables are strategic substitutes. These assumptions are also consistent
with earlier works, which use a Cournot framework to model competition among the Big Three.
Berndt et al. (1990) cannot reject the Cournot model in this context, and Doyle and Snyder
(1999) use it to test for information-sharing.
In the previous section we show that the pattern of production targets in the U.S. auto industry
is consistent with the theoretical framework. To complete the analysis, it is important to discuss
two key aspects. First, we identify sources of adjustment costs in the auto industry. Second, we
question the manufacturers’ incentives to reveal their production targets truthfully. We discuss
each aspect in turn.
First, the model assumes that production targets are associated with some real actions, which
cannot be costlessly reversed. Auto manufacturers are continuously taking actions that aﬀect
their future production capabilities. They contract parts from suppliers, hire temporary labor,
cancel vacations, etc. It seems natural to assume that such production-related decisions are costly
to change. A late order of parts may be more expensive, revising previously signed contracts
may involve penalties, ﬁring workers results in compensation payments, and changing promises
may have reputational costs. Moreover, auto manufacturers deal with many third parties, both
on the supply and the retail level. If these parties also organize their plans according to the
manufacturers’ publicly posted targets, a change in these targets may cause them some adjustment
costs which may later feed back to the manufacturers’ proﬁts.
The contracting channel is one of the main sources of adjustment costs. Given the magnitude
and timing of the processes involved in the industry, forward contracts are widespread. In prin-
ciple, every change in plans would involve renegotiating these contracts. In reality this does not
happen so often, as contracts often stipulate clauses that deal with these instances. Typical part
contracts in the industry explicitly specify minimum and maximum monthly orders, assigning
ﬁnancial penalties to deviations from this contracted range. Even if these contracts are never
renegotiated, implicit adjustment costs arise when contracting with diﬀerent parties does not si-
multaneously take place. Since parts are complements in production (consider, for example, an
O-ring production function), once contracts are signed sequentially each new contract represents
a stronger commitment to a certain production level. Therefore, signing new contracts, which are
not fully consistent with earlier signed contracts, carries an implicit adjustment cost, as it would
have been cheaper if previous contracts had been set diﬀerently.
Second, in the analysis we assume that the manufacturers’ reported production targets to
Ward’s truthfully represent their real production plans. This is an important assumption. If
these announcements were not anchored to any real decision, they would constitute pure cheap
talk. Our view, which is consistent with conversations with manufacturers and Ward’s publishers,
22See Kahn (1992) and Bresnahan and Ramey (1994) for theory and evidence about the relationship between
sales and production. See also Judd (1996) for a dynamic model of inventories in a framework similar to ours.
17is that real actions taken by these ﬁrms are diﬃcult to hide from others. Hiring processes for
extra shifts, orders of big amounts of windshields, or the construction of a new plant can be easily
monitored, not only by competitors, but also by Ward’s,b yt h ep r e s s ,a n db yo t h e re x t e r n a l
analysts. The main task of the trade journal is to report these actions to third parties (suppliers,
dealers, etc.), which cannot perform the monitoring so easily.23 As we argue above, third parties’
plans crucially depend on this information. Moreover, ﬁrms are aware that both Ward’s and
other external parties monitor the information they provide to Ward’s. Finally, one should note
that strategic considerations may also work towards providing incentives for truthful reporting.
If commitment is achieved by credible higher production targets, then credibility can only be
achieved by a reputation for truthful reporting. Given all the above, we consider the production
targets published at Ward’s a good proxy for real decisions being taken by ﬁrms. They may
represent monthly snapshots of the real underlying continuous decision processes taking place,
like the one described by our theoretical model.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper studies the dynamics of pre-production preparation as a commitment device in a
quantity setting framework with adjustment costs. We show that ﬁrms have a strategic incentive
to exaggerate their production targets in an attempt to achieve a Stackelberg leadership position.
More precisely, ﬁrms start by ﬁrst steadily increasing their intended production levels and only
as production gets closer, do production targets gradually decline. As a result, ﬁnal production
levels are higher than in a static framework.
We test the main predictions of the theory using data on production targets in the U.S.
auto industry. The observed production targets exhibit a non-monotonic pattern similar to the
one predicted by the theory. While one can write down a variety of theoretical models that
could explain why production targets are higher than eventual production,24 it is harder to ﬁnd
alternative explanations for the non-monotonic pattern. This encourages us to view these ﬁndings
as empirical support for the existence of adjustment costs and for the relevance of the strategic
role of pre-production preparations in determining ﬁnal production decisions.
This study has intentionally abstracted from informational issues as a way to focus on the
strategic aspects. Our view is that in reality both components are important and should be ac-
counted for. Given that the model can be easily extended to accommodate (common) uncertainty,
as well as multiple players, asymmetries, and a repeated interaction, one could seriously pursue a
23One could argue that the only reason to publish such information would be its commercial value to third parties.
Potential readers are encouraged to subscribe to Ward’s with the following quote: “News and numbers you can’t do
without. Auto analysts and decision-makers must get the latest, vital statistics on the industry’s health, plus up-
dated news, analysis and projections that impact their companys’ futures.” (http://wardsauto.com/war/index.htm)
24For example, in the presence of uncertainty, if adjusting quantity downwards is cheaper than adjusting it
upwards, then over-targetting would have an option value.
18more structural estimation approach. This would be interesting for policy purposes, as one could,
for example, quantify the intensity of competition (estimating how far the equilibrium is from the
Cournot levels) or perform welfare analysis.25 We leave this exercise for future work.
On a methodological level, we think that our exercise illustrates the empirical potential of non-
stationary predictions. As they exhibit rich interesting dynamics, they provide sharp qualitative
predictions which have the potential to be empirically veriﬁed or falsiﬁed. All they require is
exogenous variation in time, which is typically satisﬁed, but do not require further exogeneity
assumptions.
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20Appendix
The appendix derives the equations that describe the solutions to three extension of the benchmark
model, as discussed in Section 2.4.








































We can now substitute this back into equation (24), as well as the symmetric solution for all other
xt




























We guess that the value function will be symmetric in the opponents’ state variables, so that
the quadratic value function can be written as
V t

















= At + Btqi + CtQ−i + Dtq2
i + EtR−i + FtqiQ−i + GtS−i
where Q−i =
P
j6=i qj, R−i =
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j6=i q2




k6=i,j qjqk.N o t et h a tQ2
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(Bt +2 Dtqi + FtQ−i) (28)
























After collecting terms (and reversing signs for A0, B0, etc. as in the benchmark model) and
equating coeﬃcients, we obtain the following law of motion:




















          

1
2B2 +( N − 1)BC
2BD+ BF(N − 1) + CF(N − 1)
BF +2 BE +2 CD+ CF(N − 2) + 2BG(N − 2)
2D2 + F2(N − 1)
1
2F2 +4 DE +2 FG(N − 2)
4DF +2 EF + F2(N − 2) + 2FG(N − 2)
1
2F2 +2 EF +4 GD +4 FG(N − 3)


          

(30)
21with the boundary condition (for t = T)g i v e nb y

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(31)
Asymmetric Players We keep notation as before, with the addition of superscripts to denote
the identity of the player. Thus, player i’s adjustment costs function is now ci(xi,t)=θi
2 x2
i,h e r
(constant) marginal cost is ci,a n dAi
t to Fi
t denote i’s value function coeﬃcients.
One can start by following the same steps as in Section 2.1. The ﬁrst diﬀerence appears in
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By collecting terms one obtains the law of motion for the coeﬃcients in player i’s value function
(symmetrically for player j):













































with the boundary condition given by

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     

(36)
22Uncertainty We follow the same steps as in Section 2.1 with few modiﬁcations. Now there are
two value functions, depending on the state of the economy. Let these two value functions be VL









































and symmetrically for H. Now one can obtain the corresponding diﬀerential equations as in
equations (5) and (8), resulting in a system of twelve ODE’s. The law of motion for the coeﬃcients
associated with the L state is

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Additional six symmetric equations are associated with the H state. This structure is identical
to the benchmark model except for the fact that, in each equation, with probability λ we switch
to the other value function. Finally, the boundary conditions are given by the diﬀerent proﬁt
functions at each state.
23Figure 1: Parameters of the value function
This ﬁgure plots the value function parameters in the benchmark model, when parameters are
set to a = b =1 , c =0 ,a n dθ =1 . The value function is given by equation (6):
V t
i (qi,q j)=At + Btqi + Ctqj + Dtq2
i + Etq2
j + Ftqiqj
and the ﬁgure below shows how each of its parameters change over time. The parameters can
be thought of either as initial value functions for games with diﬀerent horizons (so T is on the
horizontal axis), or as continuation values within a particular game (so t is on the horizontal axis).
Due to the Markov structure, these two interpretations are identical. One can see (and we verify
with longer horizons) that as the horizon becomes longer all parameters, except for the constant
A0, approach zero. A0 converges to approximately 0.0925. Thus, for games with long horizons










































Figure 1: Parameters of the value function
24Figure 2: Equilibrium path and oﬀ-equilibrium strategies
This ﬁgure plots the equilibrium path in the benchmark model, when parameters are set to
a = b =1 , c =0 ,a n dθ =1 , and initial production plans are at the Cournot level of 1
3.I t
shows that equilibrium path is non-monotonic: it peaks at about 0.4 and then declines towards
0.37, which is the equilibrium production level. This level is higher than the Cournot level of
1
3. The dashed lines illustrates oﬀ-equilibrium path strategies. It simulates a shock, occurring at
date t = −4, which exogenously and unexpectedly drops one of the player’s production target
to 1
3. The subsequent dashed lines present the equilibrium path in the continuation game, after
the shock. It shows that the leadership position persists, illustrating why players cannot credibly


























Figure 2: Equilibrium path and oﬀ-equilibrium strategies
25Figure 3: Equilibrium path with diﬀe r e n t( s y m m e t r i c )i n i t i a la c -
tions
This ﬁgure plots the equilibrium path in the benchmark model, when parameters are set to
a = b =1 , c =0 ,a n dθ =1 .I t d o e s s o f o r d i ﬀerent values of initial production plans: 1
3 (the
Cournot level), 0.37, 0.4, 0.43, 0.46,a n d0.5 (the Stackelberg level). All cases are of full symmetry,
in parameters and in initial actions, so the equilibrium path is identical for both players in each
case. Clearly, equilibrium paths of the diﬀerent cases do not cross each other. Note, however,
that ﬁnal production levels are much closer (around 0.37 in all cases, but not the same, keeping
the same ordering as that of initial levels) to each other compared to the initial production plans.
Note also that the equilibrium path is non-monotonic when initial actions are suﬃciently low (less
than about 0.44 in this case), with the peak being closer to the deadline as the initial actions are
lower. When initial actions are higher, equilibrium path is monotone, but the rate of decrease in


























Figure 3: Equilibrium path with diﬀerent (symmetric) initial actions
26Figure 4: Equilibrium path with diﬀerent horizons
This ﬁgure plots the equilibrium path in the benchmark model, when parameters are set to
a = b =1 , c =0 ,a n dθ =1 , and initial production plans are 1
3 (the Cournot level). It does so for
diﬀerent horizons: 100, 50, 10,a n d1. As can be seen, as the horizons gets longer, players have
more time to smooth out their production target increase, therefore peaking at a higher level.
Once the deadline gets closer, however, this higher build-up declines faster, leading to an increase
in cost. Final production levels do not change by much, unless the horizon is very short (as is the




































































































Figure 4: Equilibrium path for diﬀerent horizons
27Figure 5: Equilibrium path with diﬀe r e n ta d j u s t m e n tc o s tp a r a -
meters
This ﬁgure plots the equilibrium path in the benchmark model, when parameters are set to
a = b =1 , c =0 , and initial production plans are 1
3 (the Cournot level). It plots diﬀerent
cases for the adjustment cost parameters, θ (0.1, 1,a n d10). One can clearly observe that as
adjustment costs are lower, production targets peak higher, as it is both cheaper to achieve these
levels, and lower targets do not provide enough commitment. The picture also suggests that
ﬁnal production levels decrease with θ. This may be misleading. Since production level is 1
3 for

































Figure 5: Equilibrium path with diﬀerent adjustment cost parameters
28Figure 6: Illustration of how the best response functions change
as a result of adjustment costs
This ﬁgure sketches the dynamic eﬀect of adjustment costs in the context of a two-period
model. The solid lines are the static best response functions. The dashed lines are the best
response functions when production targets are higher than the Cournot level. Due to adjustment
costs, the best response function rotates at the level of the production target, and becomes less
responsive to the opponent’s action. The new equilibrium is therefore given by the intersection










Figure 6: Illustration of how the best response functions change as a result of adjustment costs
29Figure 7: Asymmetric players with diﬀerent marginal costs
This ﬁgure plots the equilibrium path in a two-player model with asymmetric players. Parame-
ters are set to a = b =1 ,a n dθ =1 . One player has zero marginal costs (c1 =0 ), while the other
has positive marginal costs (c2 =0 .2). The ﬁgure plots three diﬀerent cases, for diﬀerent initial
production plans. As players are asymmetric, each case has two paths, one for each player. The
thin solid lines present the case where initial production plans are at the Cournot level (q1 =0 .4,
q2 =0 .2). The dashed lines present the case of a reversed initial production plans (q1 =0 .2,
q2 =0 .4), and the thick solid lines present the case of identical initial plans (q1 = q2 =0 .3). As
the horizon is reasonably long, in all cases the lower marginal cost player (player 1) eventually
gains higher market share. Her market share is higher the higher is her initial production plan. It
is somewhat interesting to note that player 2 ends up producing (slightly) less than her Cournot
level in one of the cases (0.195 compared to her Cournot level of 0.2). Total production is higher


































Figure 7: Asymmetric players with diﬀerent marginal costs
30Figure 8: Asymmetric players with diﬀerent adjustment costs
This ﬁgure plots the equilibrium path in a two-player model with asymmetric players. Para-
meters are set to a = b =1 ,a n dc =0 . One player (player 1), however, has higher adjustment
cost parameter than her opponent. As discussed in the text, it is somewhat interesting that once
initial conditions are suﬃciently low (as in the ﬁgure), it is the more ﬂexible player who is able to
obtain higher market shares. It is not clear if this commitment advantage persists for any value

































Figure 8: Asymmetric players with diﬀerent adjustment costs
31Figure 9: Equilibrium path in the repeated game
This ﬁgure plots the equilibrium path of the repeated game described in Section 2.5. Para-
meters are set to a = b =1 , c =0 , θ =1 , T =1 0 , ϕ =0 .1,a n dβ =0 .9. Production plans follow
the same pattern before every production period, and production levels (approximately 0.37)a r e


























Figure 9: Equilibrium path in the repeated game
32Figure 10: Comparative statics in the repeated game
This ﬁgure plots the equilibrium path of the repeated game for diﬀerent levels of adjustment
costs. The rest of the parameters are set to a = b =1 , c =0 , T =1 0 ,a n dβ =0 .9.T h eﬁgure
presents a snapshot of one stage of the game. Since we solve for a steady state, this snapshot
repeats itself forever, as in Figure 9. As one can observe, ϕ mainly aﬀects the initial plans, while θ
aﬀects the dynamic pattern of plans. As discussed in the text, the case of ϕ =0is a special case in
which the equilibrium of the repeated game is identical to the benchmark model with free initial
decisions. Note, however, that even small values for ϕ are suﬃcient to generate non-monotonic





































Figure 10: Comparative statics in the repeated game
33Figure 11: Frequency and timing of production target observations
This ﬁgure provides information about the timing of the observations available. Each obser-
vation includes separate production target by each of the Big Three associated with a particular
production month. Recall, there are 372 production months in the data. Thus, one can see
that starting at around four months before production, observations are available at least on a
monthly basis, typically at the last week of the month. Earlier (more than four months in advance)







































































Figure 11: Frequency and timing of production target observations
34Figure 12: Production targets over time, pooling all data
This ﬁgure presents quartic (biweight) kernel regressions of production targets, measured by
ad
it (see equation (22)), as a function of the number of days before production, d.I td o e ss of o r
each of the major three manufacturers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler), as well as for the (unweighted)
average (Big Three). Each series is based on 1,598 observations. All estimates use bandwidth of 30
days. The dashed lines present 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Conﬁdence intervals are computed
by bootstrapping the data, and running the same kernel regression on each bootstrapped sample.






























































































































































































































































Figure 12: Production targets over time, pooling all data
35Figure 13: Production targets over time, by period
This ﬁgure presents quartic (biweight) kernel regressions of production targets, measured by
ad
it (see equation (22)), as a function of the number of days before production, d.I td o e ss of o r
each of the major three manufacturers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler), as well as for the (unweighted)
average (Big Three). Each ﬁgure reports the kernel regression estimates, estimated separately
for each decade of the data: 1965-1975 (thick solid line), 1976-1985 (dashed line), and 1986-1995
(thin solid line). The estimates for the ﬁrst decade (1965-1975) only start about 120 days before











































































































































































































































































Figure 13: Production targets over time, by period
36Figure 14: Production targets over time, by calendar month
This ﬁgure presents quartic (biweight) kernel regressions of production targets, measured by
ad
it (see equation (22)), as a function of the number of days before production, d.I td o e ss of o r
each calendar month separately, to account for potential seasonality of model-year product-life-
cycle eﬀects. Each ﬁgure presents the kernel regression estimates for each of the Big Three, as
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Figure 14: Production targets over time, by calendar month
37Figure 15: Production targets over time, for positive and negative
production growth
This ﬁgure presents quartic (biweight) kernel regressions of production targets, measured by
ad
it (see equation (22)), as a function of the number of days before production, d.I td o e ss of o r
each of the major three manufacturers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler), as well as for the (unweighted)
average (Big Three). Each ﬁgure reports the kernel regression estimates, estimated separately for
production months with positive production growth (thick line) and negative production growth
( t h i nl i n e ) .M u c ho ft h ev a r i a t i o ni np r o d u c t i o ngrowth is due to seasonality. As discussed in the









































































































































































































































































Figure 15: Production targets over time, for positive and negative production growth
38Figure 16: Revisions in production targets
This ﬁgure presents quartic (biweight) kernel regressions of the revisions in production targets,
measured by sd
it (see equation (23)), as a function of the number of days before production, d.
The units of sd
it are in basis point change, per day. The ﬁgures present the pattern for each of
the major three manufacturers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler), as well as for the (unweighted) average
(“Big Three”). Each series is based on 1,239 observations (taking ﬁrst diﬀerences, we lose the
earliest observed announcement for each production month). All estimates use bandwidth of 30
days. The dashed lines present 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Conﬁdence intervals are computed
by bootstrapping the data, and running the same kernel regression on each bootstrapped sample.

























































































































































































































































Figure 16: Revisions in production targets
39Table 1: Frequency estimates of revision signs
This table provides frequency estimates of the direction of production target revisions. The
inequalities are constructed in such a way that estimates of 0.5 imply random revisions and
estimates greater than 0.5 are consistent with the theoretical predictions. As one can observe, all
numbers but one are greater than 0.5, none of them is signiﬁcantly less than 0.5,a n dt h em a j o r i t y






it )a Pr(Qit <A Late
it )a
Big 3 Average 0.614∗∗ 0.628∗∗ 0.740∗∗
GM 0.474 0.584∗∗ 0.763∗∗
Ford 0.667∗∗ 0.509 0.676∗∗
Chrysler 0.511 0.528 0.543
Obs. 135 286 359
∗∗ Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.5 at 95% conﬁdence level.
a For each i and t we construct A
Early
it as the average of Ad
it such that d<−110. Respectively,
for AMiddle
it we use d ∈ [−110,−50] and for ALate
it we use d>−50. Changing the cutoﬀ levels for
these variables has no eﬀect on the results.
40